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Cash transfer programs are rare in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This paper describes the 
evolution of a cash transfer program in major urban centers of Mozambique, from its 
inception in 1990 through two major reorganizations until October 1998.  Appropriate 
design, strong multisectoral political support and adequate administrative capacity are 
critical factors determining the success of such programs.  Key lessons applicable to other 
resource-poor countries designing social assistance programs are drawn, recommending 
adequate targeted support to truly destitute persons incapable of physical labor in urban 
areas where administrative costs are more manageable than in more isolated rural sites. 
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 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Subsidies on goods or services frequently form important parts of a government's 
overall anti-poverty strategy.  Yet economists note that providing such subsidies is often 
theoretically the same as providing households with an equivalent amount of cash, and 
question whether the direct provision of cash to the household might not be more cost-
effective.   Still, many countries continue to provide general or more targeted subsidies 
for goods or services instead of providing households with cash.  Some studies have 
suggested that administrative and informational demands may prevent a cash transfer 
program from operating effectively in developing countries.  Capacity to administer a 
program may be especially weak in rural areas, thus excluding this option for a large part 
of a developing country=s poor population (refer to Subbarao et al. (1996) for a 
comparative discussion of alternative safety net programs).  
Mozambique's urban cash transfer program is a rare example of a cash transfer 
program operating in a developing country.
1  The program began in 1990 as GAPVU, the 
Gabinete de Apoio à População Vulnerável (Office for Assistance to the Vulnerable 
Population), and now is administered under INAS, the Instituto Nacional de Acção Social 
(National Institute for Social Action).  Since its inception, the main purpose of the 
                                                            
1 The only other program on the continent of which the authors are aware is a @social pension@ scheme 
paid to the elderly (men 65 or older; women 60 or older) in South Africa, which was initiated in 1992/93.  
Transfers are paid in cash to qualified elderly recipients in both rural and urban areas irrespective of previous 
contributions to the scheme (Case and Deaton 1996).  2 
 
program has been to assist destitute urban households in Mozambique, although in 1998 
the program began to expand outside of provincial capitals into much smaller urban 
centers.  In the future, it plans to expand operations to serve rural areas. 
While the Government of Mozambique is now piloting other social assistance 
programs around the country, the urban cash transfer program remains a key element of 
the social safety net.  Indeed, the cash transfer program remains the only truly national 
urban safety net program for the poor.  It is the main government program designed to 
provide general social assistance to the poorest households on a permanent basis and is 
the program with the longest history and the most significant coverage.  Clearly, the 
urban cash transfer program represents an important commitment on the part of the 
government to its most vulnerable citizens, and in the past has made a significant 
contribution to their well-being.    
Large, permanent social assistance programs, targeting a broad range of needy 
individuals, frequently do not seem fiscally or politically sustainable in resource-poor 
countries because of the limited resources available to the government and the vast array 
of competing priorities.  Yet various internal reviews of Mozambique's cash transfer 
program have emphasized that it can serve as an important part of the government's 
overall strategy of social assistance, suggesting that more narrowly targeted programs can 
play a significant role in alleviating poverty among selected groups.  Cash transfer 
programs may be especially appropriate for those countries emerging from conflict that  3 
 
has shattered the social networks that individuals relied on to buffer them from hardship 
in the past.  
The purpose of this study is to document changes in this important program over 
time in order to provide insights into whether cash transfer programs can operate 
effectively in developing countries and to suggest how developing-country governments 
might structure such programs to make them more effective.   
The Mozambique experience indicates a number of lessons for the design and 
implementation of such programs. 
  
TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
 Although it can be supported through capacity-building initiatives, the process of 
scaling-up should be careful not to exceed the resource constraints and administrative 
capacity of the government.  Pilot testing is key to working out administrative and logistic 
procedures.  Authorities should recognize that they must support and pay for good 
administration, a point which is often neglected.  Regulations and lines of authority need 
to be clear, simple, and relatively stable.  The administrative system must have reasonable 
financial and administrative controls in place.  Monitoring and evaluation procedures 
should pay attention to the operation and the impact of the program on desired social 
objectives, not only on numerical counts of beneficiaries. Eligibility criteria should be 
based on measurable, preferably visible, indicators correlated with income, rather than on  4 
 
actual measurement of income.  Benefit amounts should be adjusted automatically to 
keep pace with inflation.  
 
FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL 
To ensure sustainability, funding should be linked to a fairly stable source of funds 
(for example, luxury or valued-added taxes).  Program authorities must also think 
strategically about how to manage internal and external political pressures.  They must 
convince political authorities to view the transfer as an important component of the safety 
net strategy for the poor and to be committed to serious investment in safety nets.  
Empowering the poor and linking them with sympathetic individuals in the government 
can create a significant source of political support for the program. 
 
 2.  OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROGRAM 
 
 
The structural adjustment program of 1987 sparked the creation of the urban cash 
transfer program.  In Mozambique, there was a particular need to address the influx of 
persons dislocated by war and the economic hardships imposed by war.  The government 
and international financial institutions recognized the potentially negative impact of 
structural adjustment on welfare, and structural adjustment plans at the time incorporated 
elements to address the social costs of adjustment.   5 
 
In the early 1990s, the government had some components of a social safety net in 
place, including the distribution of free food to vulnerable families in rural areas; price 
controls on some basic foods in Maputo and Beira; and a new National Social Insurance 
Scheme.   The urban cash transfer program was also part of a standard set of practices 
being advocated at the time by the World Bank as part of its Social Dimensions of 
Adjustment (SDA) program.  The urban cash transfer had been only one program in a 
group of interventions suggested in the World Bank's Food Security Study for 
Mozambique (1989).  In 1989, the Bank recommended improved coverage of the existing 
ration system and indirect income transfers through subsidies on inferior goods, such as 
yellow maize, but by 1990, a targeted cash transfer was being portrayed by consultants as 
a more efficient alternative to the costly and poorly functioning ration scheme.  The urban 
cash transfer program was perceived as a way to replace the subsidy system with minimal 
political and social resistance.    
In June 1990, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution to create GAPVU as a 
unit within the Ministry of Finance.  The Ministers ordered the large-scale 
implementation of GAPVU by September 1990, even though, in a prescient observation, 
a consultant at the time noted that GAPVU "was in no way [yet organizationally] 
prepared for this task" (Schubert 1990). 
The evolution of the urban cash transfer program can be divided into three stages: 
(1) the design and initial implementation stage from the creation of GAPVU in 1990 
through 1991; (2) the reorganization and expansion phase from 1992 through early 1996;  6 
 
and (3) the restructuring phase from mid-1996 through end of 1998, which includes 
another major reorganization.  At the end of the first stage, only 572 beneficiary 
households were enrolled in the GAPVU program (Schubert 1992).  In contrast, at the 
height of the expansion phase in 1996, the number of beneficiary households reached 
92,300 (Tovela 1997).   
GAPVU was abolished in 1996, after detection of massive corruption.  The 
program underwent significant change:  it was put under the direction of a newly created 
institution, INAS,
2 the program-implementing institution for the Ministry of Coordination 
of Social Action (MICAS).  The name GAPVU was dropped but the program essentially 
stayed the same, becoming known as "INAS," because it was the largest program within 
INAS, or "the food subsidy" program.  Under tighter administrative control, the numbers 
of beneficiaries soon declined.  By December 1997 the urban cash transfer program had 
                                                            
2 The creation of INAS was the recognition by the Ministry of Coordination of Social Action (MICAS) 
of the need for an independent institution that would be responsible for implementing social assistance 
programs.  The role of INAS is not only to continue with the cash transfer payment, but to support social 
services delivery in general, including the expansion and development of a more complete social action program 
whereby emphasis is placed on programs that will ultimately lead to a reduction in poverty, not just poverty 
alleviation.  The latter includes programs such as cash-for-work for vulnerable households, training and income-
generating initiatives, and an urban-to-rural resettlement program.  7 
 
about 30,000 beneficiary households, less than one-third the number of claimed 
beneficiaries at the height of the program (INAS 1997).  
Each of these phases reflects the interaction of distinct interest groups as well as 
actions taken in response to a series of evaluations conducted throughout the program's 
existence.  A summary of key conclusions and recommendations emerging from each of 
these evaluations is provided in Table 1.  
 
 3.  EVOLUTION OF PROGRAM COMPONENTS  
 
 
While the overall objective of the cash transfer program never seemed to have 
changed much, there were changes in the organizational structure, target groups, the level 
of coverage, the amount of the transfer, eligibility requirements, and administration. 
These changes, described here, often occurred in response to external as well as internal 
pressures, and, in the end, had a cumulative negative effect on the effectiveness and 
sustainability of the program, resulting in a full-scale reorganization beginning in 1996. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
From the outset, the Government has viewed the cash transfer as a poverty 
alleviation tool and not as an instrument that will lead to widespread poverty reduction 
(Boletim 1993).  It has consistently retained the program's original objective to "minimize 
difficulties" of the poor.    8 
 
The transfer itself was never envisioned to cover all basic costs of living, but was 
officially titled a "food subsidy"  (subsídio de alimentos).   The reasons for calling a cash 
transfer a "food subsidy" are unclear, but it was probably due to the assumption that the 
cash provided would be used to purchase additional food, or because it could be 
promoted from the political standpoint as a substitute for the food rationing system, or 
because of  an increasing recognition of food insecurity as a major urban problem.  In at 
least one case, the scheme was conceptualized as protecting those urban poor who were 
so lacking in purchasing power that they might not have even been able to access the 
urban food ration program (Schubert 1990). 
Due to the name and primary intended end use of the subsidy, several feasibility 
studies and evaluations predicting the potential contribution of the subsidy to food 
consumption converted the monetary value of the subsidy into its caloric equivalent 
(Schubert 1990, 1992; Schubert and Antezana 1991; Tovela 1997; Bazo 1998).  This 
amount was to correspond to that needed to purchase a certain amount of supplemental 
calories.  For example, Schubert (1992) found that vulnerable households were 
consuming only 1,150 kilocalories per day per adult equivalent unit
3 and recommended 
an increase in the subsidy sufficient to acquire an additional 450 kilocalories per day per 
adult equivalent unit to assure the survival of household members. The resolution 
                                                            
3 Adult equivalent units, unlike per capita calculations, take into account age- and sex-based differences 
in caloric needs.    9 
 
officially establishing GAPVU called for the readjustment of the value of the subsidy in 
proportion to increases in the national minimum wage.  Since the latter was theoretically 
supposed to cover all essential costs of living, the food subsidy would, in theory, be 
adjusted to account for any increases in the cost of calories.  
Although the initial calculation of the subsidy amount may have been based on 
these estimates, subsequent suggestions to explicitly tie the amount to the cost of the 
supplemental calories were never adopted.   No evidence of such adjustments tied to 
caloric needs is apparent in the available records. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The organizational structure of the cash transfer program has always been 
characterized by substantial interministerial collaboration, particularly among the 
Ministries of Finance, Social Action, Health, and, to some extent, State Administration.   
Key political backing for the creation of GAPVU came from the Minister of Finance, Sr. 
Magid Osman, and the Minister of Health, Sr. Fernando Vaz, and initially GAPVU was 
organizationally attached to the Ministry of Finance. 
The first director of GAPVU was from the Ministry of Finance, and the provincial 
units of GAPVU (which, except for Maputo City and the provinces containing Nacala 
and Maxixe, were composed of only the provincial capitals) were led by the provincial 
directors of Finance, known as delegados (Schubert 1993a).  These delegados were 
responsible for ensuring the monthly payment of the transfer to the beneficiaries.  In  10 
 
addition, because clinic staff were used to verify the qualifications of some beneficiary 
households, each provincial-level GAPVU unit also had a representative from the 
Ministry of Health who was responsible for assuring good cooperation between the health 
centers and the GAPVU program. 
In early 1992, as part of the first reorganization of GAPVU, the responsibility for 
the directorship of the program was transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the 
Secretariat of Social Action (SEAS) (Schubert 1993a).  This reorganization would not be 
officially finalized until much later, in 1993, with Decreto No. 16/93 (see Figure 1).   
Later, SEAS would become the Ministry of Coordination of Social Action 
(MICAS), but at the time, SEAS was a young agency that had been designated as a 
"home" for many social assistance activities previously located throughout the 
government.  Officially, SEAS was responsible for defining the technical criteria for who 
should be included in the program, for hiring and firing the Director and Assistant 
Director of GAPVU, and for defining the objectives and functioning of Advisory 
Councils for the delegados operating within each city.  Still, although it was technically 
under the direction of SEAS, GAPVU functioned largely as an autonomous institution. 
The transfer of the program to SEAS made sense organizationally, as GAPVU 
would now be under the auspices of an institution whose institutional mission was to care 
for the most needy.  However, the influence of the Ministry of Finance, whose 
institutional objective was not necessarily social, was still strong, and it was still 
responsible for deciding how much of the annual state budget GAPVU would receive.   11 
 
Since GAPVU was being funded principally from the state budget (the exceptions being 
one technical position paid by UNICEF and external consultants paid by SDA funds), this 
annual allocation set a limit on the amount of money and, hence, on the number of 
beneficiaries that could be covered.  Furthermore, Ministry of Finance personnel at the 
provincial level still functioned as delegados responsible for the actual payments.  Thus, 
the Ministry of  Finance continued to control the financial aspects of the program. 
Interministerial coordination and advice was provided through the Conselho de 
Administração, or Administrative Council, a national-level advisory council consisting of 
the director of GAPVU and representatives from different ministries.  This council was 
responsible for providing direction on protocols to put in place to implement the program, 
evaluating the  functioning of the program=s management, and conducting periodic 
evaluations of GAPVU's activities.  Along with SEAS, the Ministries of Finance, Health, 
State Administration, and Labor were also on the council (Schubert 1993a).   
While the council met on a regular basis and often made suggestions to improve the 
functioning of the program, its role was strictly advisory.  Consequently, the council was 
not capable of enforcing major changes in the functioning of GAPVU without the 
agreement of the institution itself (Piaraly 1998).  In retrospect, the financial 
independence of GAPVU from SEAS and its organizational independence from the 
Ministry of Finance and the Administrative Council may have weakened the 
government's ability to provide effective oversight by leaving the Director of GAPVU 
with considerable autonomy concerning program direction and implementation.  12 
 
During the design and expansion phase, the urban cash transfer program had two 
major sources of assistance outside of the state budget.  In financial terms, UNICEF 
provided the most significant support, paying the salary of the only expatriate technical 
assistant permanently based in the program and buying some equipment.  UNICEF=s 
interest in the program clearly was linked to the high percentage of GAPVU recipients 
who were impoverished families with malnourished children.  In addition, as previously 
mentioned, the SDA project, supervised by the World Bank in Mozambique, received 
support from the governments of Britain, Holland, Switzerland, and Germany (Schubert 
1993a).  SDA/GTZ (Germany) funds were used to support the principal technical 
assistance provided by the project: numerous visits by Team Consult Berlin to assist in 
the design and evaluation of the project. The detailed reports of the principal consultant, 
Bernard Schubert, serve as a major source of information concerning the evolution of the 
program from 1990 through 1995. 
There were substantial delays in filling posts specified in the organizational 
structure throughout the existence of GAPVU.  In early 1993, two of the five main 
management positions still had not been filled.  Part of the problem was that, although 
created in 1990, GAPVU did not yet have official regulations that allowed it to hire 
permanent staff.  This personnel gap was exacerbated when the Head of the Department 
of Administration and Finance was fired around the same time.  By the second half of 
1993, lack of sufficient administrative capacity had pushed the organization to the brink, 
as reflected in the title of Schubert's October 1993 evaluation:  "To Conquer the Crisis in  13 
 
GAPVU's Management Capacity (Para Vencer a Crise de Capacidade de Gestão do 
GAPVU)."   
In September 1993, Decreto No. 16/93 made the transfer of the program from the 
Ministry of Finance to SEAS official.  The decree also authorized GAPVU to hire staff 
on a more permanent basis and confirmed some additional organizational changes (Figure 
2).   For example, previously, one individual had been responsible for supervision of all 
delegados; that responsibility was now split between two people.  This division was an 
explicit recognition that it was not feasible for a single individual to adequately supervise 
all the delegados.  This organizational structure was maintained until the abolishment of 
GAPVU in 1996. 
After uncovering significant corruption in 1996, technically GAPVU was 
abolished, but in essence the program continued.  Responsibility for the program was 
transferred to the Program Department of INAS, in the Ministry of Social Action.  The 
organizational structure of INAS and the cash transfer program that has existed since 
1996 (as of October 1998) is shown in Figure 3.  However, despite the ostensible transfer 
of administration to INAS,  use of delegados from the Ministry of Finance has continued. 
 Although INAS has begun the transfer of the functions from the provincial directors of 
Finance to provincial directors of Social Action, that transition had not been completed as 
of October 1998.  With the expansion of the program outside of provincial capitals, sub-
delegados were also been appointed.  14 
 
 This latest reorganization encourages greater collaboration between government 
and international nongovernmental organizations in planning new programs and 
implementing existing programs.  The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
has been financially supporting the consultants who are assisting in formulating the new 
directions of the social assistance framework (Thompson 1998), and INAS is currently 
seeking new partnerships with a range of donors to assist in financing its programs in 
addition to receiving continued support from the government budget. 
In retrospect, it is clear that the original organizational structure and repeated 
reorganizations made demands that overwhelmed Mozambique's limited administrative 
capacity. Adequately trained staff were few, and administrative controls were weak.  The 
reporting and oversight lines for GAPVU were unclear, divided between the Ministry of 
Finance and others.  At the same time, GAPVU struggled to supervise and coordinate 
staff from other ministries at the local level.  In the end, management assessment and 
evaluation were essentially left to outside consultants who arrived periodically and the 
Administrative Council who gave occasional input.  Program redesign was the 
responsibility of outside consultants.    Monitoring and evaluation were not effectively 
incorporated directly into program management.   
For over two years the program was unable to offer permanent jobs to staff, which 
complicated efforts to recruit staff for critical management positions. This structure and 
situation apparently allowed GAPVU to operate more or less independently at higher 
levels and made control of lower levels more difficult, perhaps permitting initial  15 
 
inadequacies to worsen as they went unchecked.  As program growth occurred and 
organizational changes continued, the initially weak administrative capacities were soon 
stretched beyond their limits.  Headquarters had insufficient staff to provide 
administrative backup and meet the demands from the field in a timely fashion.   
The latest reorganization clarified lines of reporting by making one ministry 
responsible for the program.  The new administrator installed greater financial controls 
and, by verifying beneficiary qualifications, reduced the numbers of beneficiaries in the 
program, consequently reducing the administrative burden on his staff.  
 
TARGET GROUPS 
The target groups were initially identified as the poorest groups with the highest 
levels of vulnerability.  Using the best available information, specific target groups 
designated at the start of the program were residents with incomes not exceeding half the 
official minimum wage
4 who were also either 
! older than 60 years and unemployed for more than two years, 
! disabled persons older than 18 years and unable to work, 
! families with severely malnourished pregnant women, or 
! families with severely malnourished children. 
                                                            
4 The minimum wage is a monthly amount set to cover the basic food and nonfood needs of a six-person 
household.   16 
 
According to Schubert (1992), the selection of the first two categories (the elderly 
and the handicapped) emerged from characteristics of extremely poor families found in 
the Maputo household survey.  The last two groups were identified through symptoms 
(malnutrition) that were felt to be highly associated with families with food security 
problems, most likely caused by extreme poverty.  There is no official documentation that 
explains in detail the reasoning behind the choice of these target groups.  However, notes 
from the Department of Nutrition during the planning phase indicate that 92 percent of 
malnourished children came from two-parent families, the majority of which were too 
poor even to purchase food rations (Repartição de Nutrição 1990).  Therefore, planners 
seem to have used malnutrition as an indicator to target poor households, not as an 
indicator to target households with malnourished children or women. 
   From 1991 onward, evaluations mention the inclusion of two other categories of 
cash transfer recipients: households headed by women with five or more children and 
poor individuals suffering from chronic illness.  By December 1994, neither of these two 
target groups had yet been incorporated into the program (Rogers 1994).  Inclusion of the 
additional groups began in 1995 at the height of the expansion phase, but neither group 
ever attained levels of coverage equivalent to the original four target groups.   
Concern about the vastly expanded numbers of beneficiaries, rumors of corruption, 
and a questioning of the financial sustainability of the program due to declining receipts 
from sales of food aid led the Ministry of Finance to undertake a large-scale survey of 
beneficiaries in 1995 in order to seek ways to improve program operation. Amid the  17 
 
government=s own lack of resources, demands for reconstruction of infrastructure as a 
primary aim, and the increasing burden on the government=s budget, the government was 
looking for ways to verify GAPVU's beneficial impact on the poor and to reduce program 
costs.  Evaluations based on the beneficiary survey data (UAP/MPF 1995; Datt et al. 
1997; Garrett et al. 1996), along with doubts about the program's sustainability, led to a 
reformulation of government policy towards what the appropriate criteria should be for 
the selection of target groups (UAP/UUP/MPF 1997).  
The discussion about appropriate target groups for a cash transfer program revolved 
around the question of who are the most vulnerable and why and, consequently, which 
vulnerable groups should be eligible for a cash transfer.  Distinctions began to be made 
between recipients capable of physical labor and those who were not.  A consensus began 
to emerge that while the cash transfer should help the poor who could not work and really 
could not "help themselves," such as the elderly and the disabled, other programs should 
be designed for households with malnourished women and children.  These households 
were considered to have the ability to lift themselves out of poverty should appropriate 
employment opportunities arise (Datt et al. 1997; Garrett et al. 1996).  Restricting the 
types of beneficiaries served by the program would be in line with GAPVU's orientation 
as a cash transfer program and also could reduce program costs.  Moreover, even though 
the cash transfer scheme designers never expected the subsidy to resolve the malnutrition 
problem, its inability to do so began to be seen as weakness in the program=s design.  18 
 
Coming out of these discussions in 1996 and 1997 was one of the most important 
alterations in the program:  the Ministry of Finance proposed that the criteria for receiving 
the cash transfer should be an elderly person or a handicapped person living with no other 
economically active individual in the household, or to be chronically ill.  Women with 
more than five children and families with malnourished children or malnourished 
pregnant women were to be moved to other, more appropriate programs.  When the 
program was reorganized under INAS, these criteria were accepted with pilot cash-for-
work schemes being launched to provide an alternative source of income for women 
excluded from the cash transfer program.
5   
 The other major issue that emerged in the selection of appropriate target groups 
was whether the cash transfer program should be extended to rural areas.  Before the end 
of the war in 1992, food aid distribution in rural areas, whether free or through cash-for-
                                                            
5 Prior to initiating the pilot schemes, INAS conducted a survey among cash transfer beneficiaries 
exploring whether they would be interested in participating in cash-for-work schemes and what types of 
programs they would prefer.  High interest was expressed for cash-for-work programs requiring light physical 
labor (cleaning parts of the city) as opposed to those requiring heavy physical labor (road construction) (INAS 
1997).  Cash-for-work programs requiring heavy physical labor clearly would not be appropriate for 
malnourished pregnant women.  Attention must also be paid to potential decline in quality of child care if  
mothers of young children participate in these programs.  19 
 
work schemes, was the major safety net in rural areas.  After the war, the coverage of 
these schemes diminished.   
Typically, rural poverty is worse than urban poverty in very poor countries, and 
Mozambique is no exception (DPDS 1998).  Because inadequate consumption in urban 
settings is principally due to lack of purchasing power, a cash transfer was judged to be 
the appropriate intervention there (Schubert 1990), but several evaluations raised the 
issue of whether expanding cash transfer programs to rural areas was desirable or whether 
alternative social safety net programs would be more appropriate than cash transfers 
(Schubert 1992, 1993a; UAP/MPF 1995; Datt et al. 1997; UAP/UPP/MPF 1997).  Those 
emphasizing the presence of destitute individuals in rural areas also badly affected by the 
war viewed expansion of GAPVU or other appropriate safety nets into rural areas as the 
logical next step (Schubert 1992, 1993a; UAP /MPF 1995).  More recent evaluations 
focused on the high cost of serving often highly dispersed rural populations (Datt et al. 
1997; UAP/UPP/MPF 1997). 
INAS has now decided to expand into rural areas to serve those who meet the 
eligibility criteria used in urban areas.  Initial expansion of the cash subsidy program to 
small urban centers began in April 1998 with six new sites outside of provincial capitals 
(Borges 1998).  Selection of a particular site was primarily in response to pressure by 
local political authorities.   
The evolution of what is the appropriate target group to serve with a cash transfer 
in a resource-poor setting reflects a growing recognition of differences between social  20 
 
assistance programs that are capable of alleviating poverty and those that aim to reduce 
poverty, and how to more effectively differentiate among those classified as Aabsolutely 
poor.@  The reduction of the number of target groups to those incapable of physical labor 
reflects an acknowledgment of the limited resources available combined with a 
realization that investing in strategies that can raise the poor physically capable of 
working out of poverty may be more appropriate than using those resources to partially 
alleviate their impoverished state.   
The expansion of the program to rural areas reflects the need to serve highly 
vulnerable populations throughout the country, but the government should proceed 
cautiously to be certain that the infrastructure and administration will be sufficient to 
support the operational needs of the program in rural areas and to continue to evaluate the 
comparative cost-effectiveness of the program. 
 
COVERAGE 
In the early 1990s, rough estimates were made of the number of absolutely poor in 
the country, with clear distinctions drawn between the poor who were capable of working 
but lacked opportunity, and the poor who were not (Green 1991; Schubert 1992).  At the 
time of GAPVU=s inception, an estimated 15 percent of urban households were classified 
as destitute (60,000 households in total), that is, falling within the lowest per capita 
income quintile of the urban population.  These households were felt to be extremely  21 
 
food insecure as they were consuming, on average, only 60 percent of their minimum 
caloric requirements.
6  
After the creation of GAPVU in June 1990, full-scale implementation was 
expected to begin by September 1, 1990.  However, administrative personnel were hired 
slowly and considerable time was spent getting the program underway.  Consequently, the 
design and initiation phase was characterized by extremely slow rates of growth in 
numbers of beneficiaries.  At the beginning of 1991Csix months later, after its 
establishment, there were only 19 persons enrolled in the program, which only increased 
to a few hundred in the first months of 1991 (Schubert 1992). 
                                                            
6 Estimates of the number of absolute poor and destitute for all urban areas of Mozambique were based 
on results of a household expenditure survey conducted in the cities of Maputo and Tete in 1988 (Greene 1991). 
The modest rate of enrollment was severely criticized at a key meeting held on May 
27, 1991, which was chaired by the Minister of Finance.  With only 0.6 percent of the 
proposed target group in Maputo being reached (a target of 10,000 households), a 
decision was made to reorganize the program, establishing specific goals and timetables 
for the number of beneficiaries to be recruited.  The new targets were 4,000 recipients by 
June 30, 1992; 8,000 by June 30, 1993; 20,000 by June 30, 1994; and 60,000 by June 30, 
1995, the latter representing 75 percent of the estimated number of destitute beneficiaries 
in all urban areas (80,000 total) (Schubert 1992). With a numeric goal structure in place, 
recruitment rates increased dramatically. In September 1993, Schubert reported that  22 
 
coverage was @excellent,@ with the 54,000 beneficiaries enrolled not only surpassing the 
target number for June the following year but close to the overall goal of 60,000 
(Schubert 1993b).   
When the Ministry of Finance implemented its beneficiary survey in 1995, it 
acquired the actual beneficiary lists and tried with great difficulty to locate randomly 
selected participant households on the lists.  GAPVU staff in some provinces became 
extremely reluctant to assist survey implementers, who were eventually forced to locate 
beneficiaries at payment sites and accompany them to their homes to conduct the 
interview (Desai 1998). 
An internal investigation by the government in the next year, not any contracted 
evaluation, uncovered massive corruption.  The investigation revealed that many of the 
beneficiaries were imaginary, probably explaining GAPVU staff's reluctance to assist 
with the beneficiary survey.  In Tete and Quelimane, for example, over 70 percent of the 
beneficiaries did not appear after reorganization to claim their benefits (Borges 1998).  As 
a result, most staff were replaced, with the exception of those in Chimoio, Beira, and 
Lichinga (Borges 1998).   
The change in coverage and the considerable differences in extent of the program 
by target groups and cities are shown in Table 2, which compares number of beneficiaries 
on official lists from two points in time: August 1995, during the expansion phase, and 
December 1997, over a year after the most recent restructuring of the program began.  In 
1995, although over half of the urban population of the country lived in the adjacent cities  23 
 
of Maputo and Matola, the much smaller cities of Tete and Nacala equaled or exceeded 
the number of registered beneficiaries in Maputo and Matola.  In those two sites, there 
were much higher percentages of women with malnourished children enrolled in the 
program than other target groups (GAPVU 1995).  Approximately 52 percent of total 
beneficiaries were elderly, and 38 percent were women with malnourished children.  
Handicapped persons only comprised 4.2 percent of the recipients.  
In December 1997, the number of beneficiaries had declined to slightly more than 
one-third the total at the height.  The composition of the 32,391 recipients reflected the 
elimination of imaginary beneficiaries and the change in policy regarding target groups, 
with the elderly now comprising 78 percent of recipients; handicapped persons, 6 percent; 
and women with malnourished children, only 10 percent.  This latter group, along with 
malnourished pregnant women and female heads of households with more than five 
children, were gradually being phased out of the program (INAS 1997).  Moreover, 
approximately 30 percent of beneficiaries were in Maputo and Matola, with the number 
of official recipients in Nacala, Tete, Quelimane, and Pemba being reduced by over 60 
percent.    
The reorganization into INAS resulted in dramatically lower numbers of 
beneficiaries and a distribution of recipients more in line with the geographic distribution 
of the overall population.  To accurately assess how well the new program actually covers 
the eligible population, however, information is required on the numbers of persons truly 
eligible to participate, information that is not yet available.  Detailed 1997 census data to  24 
 
be released in late 1999 could assist in this process or a representative beneficiary-
nonbeneficiary survey could be conducted.  
 
SUBSIDY AMOUNT 
The 1990 resolution creating the urban cash transfer called the transfer a food 
subsidy.  The amount of the subsidy was precisely specified: The food subsidy is 7,500 
MT
7 per month for individuals not belonging to a family unit.  For family units, the 
amount of the subsidy increases to 12,500 MT or to 15,000 MT, depending if the number 
of family members is two or three or more members, respectively.  The food subsidy will 
be readjusted in proportion to increases in the minimum wage (Boletim 1993).    
                                                            
7 MT is meticais, the Mozambican currency. 
In 1993, the amount of the subsidy was raised for eligible households.   Eligible 
households, constituted by 1, 2, or 3 persons, received 20,000, 32,400, and 40,000 MT, 
respectively, and the decree again stated that appropriate adjustments would be made in 
proportion to increases in the minimum wage (Boletim 1993).  The last raise in the cash 
transfer payment occurred in 1996, with 32,000 MT monthly stipulated for a single 
individual, 51,000 MT for 2 person households, 64,000 MT for 3 person households, and 
an additional 8,000 MT for every additional household member after three (GAPVU 
1996).    25 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the intended increases in proportion to increases in the 
minimum wage never occurred on a regular basis.  From the program's inception, both the 
Ministry of Finance and MICAS felt that there should be a significant margin between the 
minimum wage and the cash transfer subsidy to promote an attitude of self-respect and to 
 motivate beneficiaries to use their own capacities to improve their socioeconomic 
situation (Mandlate 1998).  
The initial transfer for a single individual (7,500 MT) was 30 percent of the 
minimum wage (25,100 MT) in August 1990.  From that point the relative value of the 
subsidy declined steadily to 13 percent of the value of the minimum wage in early 1993.  
With the increase of the subsidy to 20,000 MT, the subsidy regained its value in relative 
terms, being 34 percent of the April 1993 minimum wage of 58,800 MT.  The relative 
value of the subsidy then again declined steadily.  After reaching a relative value of 8.8 
percent of the minimum wage, an increase of the subsidy to 32,000 MT for a single 
individual in 1996 only raised the relative value to 11.8 percent.  The subsidy once again 
declined to 9 percent of the value of the minimum wage as of September 1998.  
While the purchasing power of the minimum wage has been adjusted much more 
frequently than the subsidy (typically every 8-12 months), since 1990 the wage itself has 
never covered even the basic food needs of a six-person household in Maputo (Pires 
1997).  Based on the cost of a nutritionally balanced diet of 2,200 calories per person per 
day in Maputo, Pires (1997) calculated that from January 1990 through August 1996, the  26 
 
fluctuating value of the minimum wage ranged from being able to supply an adequate 
food basket for 1.3 to 2.7 persons. 
Obviously, the purchasing power of food subsidy has not only declined 
significantly relative to the minimum wage but has drastically dropped in real terms since 
its inception.  Practically every evaluation of the program, whether based on primary data 
collection or review of published reports, has noted the declining value of the subsidy=s 
purchasing power (refer to Table 1) and called for its increase.  Recent recommendations 
for monthly payments for a single person household include 60,000 MT (Tovela 1997), 
70,000 to 105,000 MT (Bazo 1998), with  MICAS itself recommending a level of 50 
percent of the minimum wage (177,000 MT) in July 1998 (MICAS 1998).  A per capita 
transfer capable of purchasing one-third of daily caloric needs (approximately 750 
kilocalories), based on the cost of calories for a balanced diet by region (North, Center, 
South) or province is recommended as a level that has the potential to substantially 
improve the well-being of recipients at reasonable cost, with minimal disincentive effects. 
The declining level in the real value of the subsidy is indicative to the low levels of 
political support for the program within the government.  This lack of political support 
has grown over time and has put the opportunity to have an effective cash transfer 
program in jeopardy.  After corruption was uncovered in 1996, some groups within 
parliament argued for its abolishment. Supporters of the program who believed that it was 
a vital part of the social safety net won out, but, as noted, the program's administration 
was overhauled from top to bottom.   27 
 
Now, even within the administration, support for the program is mixed.  MICAS, in 
line with its institutional mission, strongly supports the program but the Ministry of 
Finance, with effective power over the program's budget, does not (Borges 1998; 
Mandlate 1998). Proceeds from food aid sales used to fund the program have declined 
substantially in recent years.  The government must now rely more heavily on 
domestically generated funds to finance the program.  The government has only limited 
self-generated revenues, and the Ministry of Finance would prefer to use them to meet 
other demands.  Delays in adjusting the amounts are also related to the Ministry of 
Finance's desire to first evaluate how the redesigned program would fit into a revised 




ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES: ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND 
SERVICE DELIVERY 
 
The program had some eligibility criteria that applied to all potential beneficiaries 
and others that were specific for particular target groups.  All applicants had to live in a 
provincial capital or in Nacala or Maxixe for more than one year
8 and, in the initial phase 
of the program,  the monthly per capita income of the household could not exceed 26,000 
MT (US$26 per month in August 1990), a limit that was raised to 32,000 MT in the 
                                                            
8 Ostensibly, this was to discourage further rural-to-urban migration (Schubert 1990).  28 
 
expansion and restructuring phase (equivalent to US$3.54 in August 1995 declining to 
US$2.78 in August 1997).  In addition, householdswith candidates who were elderly or 
handicapped, or female heads of household with more than five children, could not live 
with any other relative between 18  and 59 years old (the "economically active" ages) and 
no household member could be absent and working in a neighboring country.  Applicants 
also had to present an identity card and to provide a signed declaration that no household 
member was working for someone else (GAPVU 1996).  Local community leaders 
helped to provide some of this documentation and worked with program staff to identify 
eligible households.  Ministry of Health staff were also involved because clinic nurses 
had to screen malnourished children and pregnant women at health clinics to be sure they 
met additional selection criteria (for example, children were supposed to fall into a 
category of less than the 3
rd percentile of appropriate weight). 
Under GAPVU, once a staff person had received an application, a home visit was 
to be made and an evaluation of the applicant=s socioeconomic status and residency 
confirmed.  With the declining value of the local currency (the metical), it became 
increasingly evident during the expansion phase that the income eligibility criteria was so 
low that it was meaningless to implement.  For some elderly people, obtaining the 
necessary identification documents from local leaders was a significant constraint to 
enrollment.  Eligibility criteria were simpler for malnourished women and children as 
they were typically accepted into the program based on nutritional status indicators only.  
Rogers (1994) noted that 90 percent of applications from malnourished pregnant women  29 
 
and malnourished children were accepted, compared to only 60-70 percent of applications 
for elderly and handicapped persons. 
A series of measures was adopted as part of the first reorganization in an effort to 
strengthen the program=s administrative capacity and potential impact of the transfer.  
Staff incentives to increase beneficiary recruitment were revised.  For example, to 
motivate nurses to process applications, a nurse would receive 500 MT for each 
application approved (Schubert 1992).  Other measures taken during the reorganization 
included the hiring of an additional two full-time managers, simplification of some of the 
eligibility criteria (for example, income statements from families of malnourished women 
and children would be accepted without subsequent verification by community leaders), 
more equipment (telephone for the central office, vehicles), and an increase in the subsidy 
level for larger families.
9   
In theory, there were explicit exit criteria.  For all categories of beneficiary 
households except pregnant women, benefits were granted for one year, after which the 
eligibility of the household was reevaluated.  Pregnant women were to be removed from 
the program 6 months after the birth of the child.  If a child continued to be malnourished, 
                                                            
9 Prior to the reorganization, the subsidy had been 7,500 MT for individuals not belonging to a family 
unit, 12,500 MT for two person families, and 15,000 MT for families with three or more persons (GAPVU 
1990).  Subsequently, the subsidy was to increase by 2,000 MT for each additional household member above 
three persons (Schubert and Antezana 1991).  30 
 
payments continued up to a maximum of five years of age.  However, confirmation of 
exit criteria required home visits, and as the system expanded, it was not possible for the 
limited number of staff to make even the required confirmatory home visits for 
enrollment. 
  Staff were stretched unrealistically thin under the GAPVU program.  Efforts to 
have banks distribute the monthly payments, and thus avoid having program staff spend 
time on monthly distribution and walk through areas with large amounts of cash, were 
futile (Schubert 1993a).  As the program expanded, demands on both supervisory and 
implementing staff became excessive.  Still, evaluations in 1993 through mid-1995 often 
extolled the high coverage rates and low administrative costs: "GAPVU is the only one of 
the urban safety net programs which is in fact operational and reaching significant 
numbers of beneficiaries" (Rogers 1994);  "The program is well-designed and well-
managed.  The cost efficiency of the program is excellent: only 3.2 percent of the total 
budget" (Schubert 1995).  
Conflicting signs regarding verification of eligibility and quality of service delivery 
began to emerge.  While some evaluations still found good administration ("the practice 
of having the Provincial Directors of Finance serve as delegates has assured regularity of 
payments and good accounting" (Schubert, May 1995)), others began to find serious 
problems:   "the application of eligibility criteria are subjective" (Rogers, December 
1994); "30 percent of households experienced interruptions in payments and there are 
discrepancies between the amount the household is supposed to receive and that the  31 
 
household actually receives" (UAP /MPF, September 1995); "59 percent of beneficiaries 
receive less than their household composition indicates that they should and 70 percent of 
elderly households receive less than they should" (Garrett et al. 1996).  Many 
beneficiaries claimed that they did not know what their payment level should be.  The 
exact reason is unknown, but GAPVU staff could have erroneously applied the rules, or 
beneficiaries, particularly the elderly, might have failed to report all households members. 
The low administrative costs that consultants cited should have raised a red flag 
about administrative controls and quality of services instead of being extolled as a 
triumph of efficiency.  Were program costs being deliberately understated?  Or were they 
so small as to jeopardize the effective operation and supervision of the program?  We 
have no evidence that the program costs were stated incorrectly, but by 1996 it was clear 
that the administration of the program was having problems (delayed, interrupted, and 
inaccurate payments) and that deviation of funds was occurring.  Many of the 
administrative problems probably came about because the program scaled up far faster 
than staff could be trained and effective supervision put in place.  The expectations 
regarding the rate of implementation of activities were substantial and, in retrospect, 
unrealistic from the very beginning.   
 The restructuring phase and the shifting of program to the newly created INAS in 
1996 were accompanied by widespread changes in administrative procedures.  Lists of 
beneficiaries were computerized, and within each province there was a lengthy procedure 
undertaken to verify all households on the list.  During this period, legitimate  32 
 
beneficiaries often did not receive payments for several months (Bazo 1998).  However, 
permanent changes in payment procedures were made to prevent the reemergence of 
nonexistent beneficiaries.  Under the new procedures, a known community leader was 
selected to serve as the resident permanente responsible for helping eligible members of 
the community enroll in the program; the delegado came from provincial headquarters 
just to make the payment. Both the permanente and the delegado kept a separate list of 
beneficiaries.  The name of a beneficiary had to appear on both lists for that beneficiary to 
receive a payment.  Moreover, the permanente had to affix his or her signature to the 
finalized payment list, an act that was not previously required (Quive 1998).   
In addition to making the permanentes more accountable for the management of 
the program, the incentive structure for those assisting INAS in identifying beneficiaries 
was modified.  Instead of receiving a token payment for every person enrolled, 
permanentes and nurses utilized by INAS on a regular basis received a monthly salary of 
300,000 MT (US$25.40) (Quive 1998).  Besides acting as an incentive to improve service 
delivery, Quive (1998) notes that the social stature of the now salaried permanentes rose 
in their communities.  Moreover, in response to criticisms that in some areas there was 
little knowledge about requirements and procedures for entry into the program and one=s 
expected subsidy based on household demographics, within each site a team of two was 
appointed to be responsible for informing communities about the existence and 
requirements of the program.   33 
 
Increased personnel and operating costs resulted in the percentage of total program 
costs dedicated to administration rising from approximately 3-5 percent (Schubert 1995) 
to around 11 percent (Borges 1998).  However, while administrative control has 
improved and attempts have been made to improve basic service delivery, the 
reorganizations have not addressed the unreasonably low level of qualifying income for 
the target groups (elderly, handicapped, and chronically ill).  As of October 1998, the 
income criteria was 32,000 MT per capita per month (nominal US$2.62).  Because it is so 
low, the staff person needs to rely on other indicators on the form (for example, presence 
of persons 18-59 years of age within the household) and personal judgment and 
observation (for example, observable assets or an elderly person having difficulty walking 
or performing simple tasks) before recommending a household's inclusion in the program.  
 
 
RATIONALE FOR KEY CHANGES IN THE PROGRAM 
The foregoing analysis of the evolution of the program pinpoints two major turning 
points in the urban cash transfer program=s history.  The first is the meeting held on May 
27, 1991, which resulted in the first reorganization of the program, and the second is the 
decision to abolish GAPVU in 1996 and transfer the functioning of the program to INAS. 
As previously mentioned, the May 1991 meeting was chaired by the Minister of 
Finance and was attended by the Vice Minister of Health, the Secretary of State of Social 
Action, all members of the Administrative Council of GAPVU, as well as by the  34 
 
management of GAPVU and key consultants.  The most important of the consultants was 
Bernard Schubert, who had been involved with evaluating the urban cash transfer since 
its initiation.  Under pressure from major donors to show progress in implementing a 
social safety net, the Minister of Finance forcefully addressed the slow implementation of 
the scheme by calling for a complete reorganization.  He supported this move by pointing 
to evidence provided by the consultant showing that overall coverage was very low, 
which in turn had resulted in extremely high administrative costs per recipient (Schubert 
and Antezana 1991).  The consultant, however, did note that due to strict application and 
approval procedures, the scheme had avoided any leakage. 
The consultant, with a rather perverse argument, wanted to "reduce beneficiary 
costs by expanding the program."  Expanding the program would not actually reduce 
costs, but if the administrative budget was kept at the same level, administrative costs 
would be lower, on a per beneficiary basis.  But given the need for adequate supervisory 
and administrative control and logistical support, "low" administrative costs were not 
necessarily indicators of good administration.  Indeed, the consultant, at the same time 
that he argued for expanding the numbers exponentially, noted that GAPVU had limited 
administrative capacity, and that this would be a major constraint on successful program 
implementation (Schubert and Antezana 1991).   This decision to expand, regardless of 
administrative capacity, reflected the pressure from donor communities to see immediate 
results, the pressure on politicians to show they were doing something for the poor, and a  35 
 
poor assessment on the part of the technical advisors on how best to reduce high 
administrative costs.  
The major consequence of the reorganization was the wholesale adoption of 
quantitative goals for enrollment by established deadlines.  Even then, the consultant 
commented that the interim targets (4,000 by June 1992; 8,000 by June 1993; 20,000 by 
June 1994) "are very modest targets and they are disappointing in view of the pressing 
problems of extreme poverty and malnutrition faced by the target groups" (Schubert and 
Antezana 1991).  This was undoubtedly true from a social point of view, but from the 
view of public management, one had to realize that the government simply did not have, 
at that stage, sufficient human or financial resources to scale up so quickly.  The adoption 
of such ambitious coverage targets became the overriding criterion for evaluating the 
success of the transfer program, minimizing the importance of careful and accurate 
targeting and efficient, effective program administration.  
MICAS and the Ministry of Finance were responsible for initiating the second 
major reform: the abolishment of GAPVU.  MICAS had already initiated the creation of a 
separate institute (INAS) for the implementation of social service delivery in 1996, and it 
was the logical institution to be responsible for reforming and managing the cash transfer 
program.  The restructuring was largely a response to the widespread corruption detected 
in the program=s administration that had been reported in local newspapers and discussed 
in Parliament (Quive 1998), but it also may reflect that MICAS had now established itself
 
and was ready to assume complete responsibility for the program.  36 
 
Changes in the structure and responsibilities of INAS also reflected a new 
understanding of what an antipoverty strategy should entail (INAS 1997).  The new 
design reflected a differentiation of vulnerable groups in terms of their capacity to 
perform physical labor.  Destitute elderly and disabled households would continue to be 
supported with cash transfers, cash-for-work opportunities would be created for 
households having malnourished children or high dependency ratios, and special 
technical training programs would be promoted for youth (United Nations Collaboration 
Program 1998).  The document also reflected a realization that given limited resources, 
government agencies such as INAS needed to work in partnership with nongovernmental 
organizations to achieve their goals.  INAS has now established a Social Fund through 
which donors can contribute to a variety of social assistance programs.  
It is of interest to note that some of the tasks to be undertaken by INAS (for 
example, an integrated scheme with concurrent cash-for-work and cash transfer 
programs) were proposed by Schubert (1992) in his document describing his vision for a 
@A Low Cost Social Safety Net for Destitute and Absolutely Poor Households in the 
Cities of Mozambique.@  This points to the long gestation period needed for certain ideas 
to penetrate into planning process as well as an evolution in how safety nets were viewed. 
 Given the proposed budget for INAS (which as of December 1998 had not yet achieved 
full financing from donors and government) and the experience with GAPVU, it is highly 
unlikely that anyone now would argue that a comprehensive safety net comes at @low 
cost.@  37 
 
 
 4.  PROGRAM IMPACT 
 
 
In addition to these operational concerns, a number of reports have evaluated 
different aspects of the program since its beginning (refer to Table 1).  Three major ways 
in which program impact can be evaluated include the following: Is the target group 
adequately reached?  Are those receiving the transfer improving their consumption 
levels?  Are the lives of those receiving the subsidy improving in other ways or are there 
some negative side-effects of the program?  
A perusal of these questions reveals that no study has yet been designed to answer 
all three at once.  Moreover, none of the evaluations has been able to fully answer the first 
question because no nationally representative evaluation has ever been done that included 
qualified nonbeneficiaries and beneficiaries of the program.  Coverage evaluation was 
frequently done in an ad hoc manner: the number of destitute persons had been roughly 
estimated based on work done by Greene (1991) and it was assumed that all persons 
enrolled in the GAPVU project met the eligibility criteria.  Therefore, coverage was 
considered to have improved based solely on the number of beneficiary families enrolled 
in the program (Schubert 1993a, 1995) without an assessment of whether all qualified 
candidates were being reached.  Several studies, however, assessed whether the 
beneficiaries being reached were qualified (Schubert 1995; Datt et al. 1997; Bazo 1998).  38 
 
Various qualitative evaluations using key informants, focus groups, and site visits 
focused mostly on general administrative aspects of the program and the importance of 
the subsidy to recipients.  No in-depth review of INAS management has ever been 
undertaken.  Although often surprisingly insightful, especially in retrospect, these reports 
are largely impressionistic.  It is clear from the series of participatory assessments and key 
informant interviews conducted by Schubert and Antezana (1991), Schubert (1993a, 
1995) and Rogers (1994) and the analysis of structured survey data (UAP/MPF 1995; 
Datt et al. 1997; Bazo 1998) that those receiving the cash transfer considered it an 
essential component of their livelihood strategies. 
A 1996 survey conducted by the Poverty Alleviation Unit was supposed to evaluate 
the impact of GAPVU on poverty, food security, and malnutrition, but cross-sectional 
data were only collected on program beneficiaries, thus preventing any genuine inference 
about the program=s targeting performance (Datt et al. 1997; Garrett et al. 1996).   Datt et 
al. (1997) did find, however, that 65 percent of GAPVU beneficiaries were poor, and that 
without GAPVU transfer benefits, 71 percent of the beneficiary population would have 
been poor.  In addition, the transfer was contributing 13 percent of the total monthly per 
capita expenditures of the participant families, not an insignificant amount.  The study 
concluded, then, that the GAPVU transfer made a significant contribution to alleviating 
the poverty of beneficiaries.  But it could not be determined whether GAPVU=s target 
groups were appropriate or whether its selection mechanisms did any better than random 
selection.  Nor could it be known whether the program participants did any better than  39 
 
similar nonparticipants in terms of rising out of poverty and reducing food insecurity and 
malnutrition.  
Although limited by a small sample size and its focus on only elderly beneficiaries, 
the 1998 study by Bazo is the only genuine evaluation that exists of the impact of the 
program on social outcomes, such as food consumption.  Using a single-visit 24-hour 
recall survey of food consumption, no significant difference was found in the mean 
number of per capita calories consumed by 41 elderly beneficiaries (1,403, kilocalories) 
and 40 elderly nonbeneficiaries meeting eligibility requirements (1,453 kilocalories) 
(Table 3).  This low level of daily caloric intake is far below the 2,200 kilocalories per 
capita recommended intake.  Elderly households were spending daily only 6,700 MT 
(US$0.58) per capita on food. Based on the typical undiversified bundle of food being 
consumed by these households, which cost 4.75 MT per calorie, the meager monthly 
subsidy of 32,000 MT could only provide 225 calories per day for one person (assuming 
all of the subsidy was spent on food, which, on average, it was not).  
Clearly by the end of 1997, the subsidy was having no significant impact on food 
consumption levels.  On the other hand, the program did seem to have other effects.  
According to Bazo, participants purchased more of their food in the market, instead of 
relying on donations from others, and showed less reliance on begging as a survival 
strategy.  Over half of the beneficiaries occasionally utilized their subsidy to participate in 
small-scale group credit schemes (xitique) compared to minimal participation in these 
schemes by nonbeneficiaries (Bazo 1998).  Thus, the cash transfer was serving as a  40 
 
supplementary coping strategy, but could not assure an adequate level of calorie 
consumption in destitute elderly households.  At such low subsidy levels, there did not 
seem to be any negative disincentive effects in terms of reduced social support from 
others in the community (Bazo 1998; Quive 1998). 
 
5.  PROGRAM STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Mozambique=s seven-year experience with an urban cash transfer program is a 
unique opportunity to assess whether an extremely poor country can successfully 
implement cash transfer programs to protect its most vulnerable citizens.  Since 
independence, the government has had a strong commitment to raising the living 
standards of its people, an effort severely affected by years of armed conflict.  One may 
question why policy advisors initially encouraged the government to undertake a targeted 
cash transfer program for which, according to Subbarrao et al. (1996), there was no prior 
experience in Sub-Saharan Africa.  However, the strong initial political support given by 
the government to the program reflected the need to provide an alternative to a failing 
rationing system and a deep awareness of the severity of its urban poverty problem.  Once 
begun, there was pressure to show success, especially given the lackluster performance of 
most other SDA-funded initiatives (Walker and Dava 1994).  Mozambique=s experience, 
though, now provides lessons for the successful design, administration, and sustainability 
of cash transfer programs in resource-poor countries.  41 
 
 
LESSONS LEARNED:  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DESIGN AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS 
 
We draw a number of important lessons in four areas of program design and 
operation (technical, administrative, financial, and political) based on this analysis of the 
urban cash transfer program.  Many of these are likely to apply to other countries. 
 
Technical and Administrative 
Policies and programs need to take a realistic account of administrative 
capabilities.  Because of limited experience and expertise to engage in dialogue with 
outside advisors, developing countries are particularly susceptible to adopting programs 
designed in and for other countries.  Moreover, international agencies, such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, often promote a standardized set of 
policy recommendations based on successful experiences in other countries.  General 
lessons may be useful, but programs must be adapted appropriately to other countries 
whose resource constraints, nature of needs, and administrative capacity may be 
completely different.  In Mozambique, insufficient attention was paid during the initial 
design of the cash transfer program to the country=s capacity to implement a nationwide 
cash transfer scheme, including realistic mechanisms for sustaining such a program.   
Because human and financial capacities are likely to be limited in resource-poor 
countries, operations must include capacity building of staff at the local as well as at the  42 
 
central level.  Programs must ensure adequate control and supervision, including 
occasional full audits and the establishment of bureaucratic reporting mechanisms.  At the 
same time, organizational structure must be sufficiently decentralized to permit efficient 
functioning of routine activities.  Programs should link, where possible, with other 
existing social programs, to collaborate in collection of information and thereby reduce 
administrative burdens. 
Good management is essential and it is not free.  Authorities should recognize 
that they must support and pay for good administration. It is not free and it is often 
neglected.  Cash transfer programs that target individuals have significant costs to verify 
compliance with eligibility requirements and to reduce leakage.  Low administrative costs 
may indicate that verification procedures are not being implemented; they are not 
automatically a sign of efficient program administration.  Administration should also be 
sufficiently decentralized so as to permit decisions to be made in a timely fashion and to 
enhance monitoring effectiveness by holding local staff accountable for program 
performance.  Given often limited administrative capacity, this observation implies that 
serious attention needs to be paid to staff training. 
Regulations and lines of authority need to be clear, simple, and relatively 
stable.  Although the program's original design was laid out in a clear, logical manner, it 
was far too complex to implement.  Lines of authority crossed institutional boundaries, 
and those that did exist were changed fairly frequently, confusing roles further and 
inhibiting attempts at effective interinstitutional coordination and management.  The lack  43 
 
of an institutional home and support reduced effectiveness of supervision and opened the 
way to exploitation of weaknesses in administration. 
The program should establish an effective monitoring and evaluation system 
linked to performance evaluations and program operations from the outset.  A 
variety of evaluation methodologies need to be used to best grasp the strengths and 
weaknesses of a program.  Participatory methodologies of program evaluation can 
provide excellent descriptions of the importance and utilization of program benefits by 
beneficiaries.  Program beneficiaries in group interviews are unlikely to report negative 
information that will severely jeopardize their receipt of a subsidy.  
In this instance, heavy reliance on participatory evaluations during the first five 
years of the program proved inadequate for detecting leakages and dishonesty among key 
informants and service providers.   For large-scale cash transfer activities, evaluation 
procedures must include randomly sampled beneficiary households from actual 
participant lists and a matching nonbeneficiary population.  In-depth studies of 
management, examining the effectiveness of its structure and procedures, as well as 
regular financial audits, should also be undertaken. 
Care should be taken to adopt indicators for evaluation that reflect the objectives of 
the program.  Monitoring and evaluation procedures should pay attention to proper 
verification, financial control, and overall program objectives.  In the case of GAPVU, 
numeric targets became the primary objective of evaluation rather than good program 
administration and impact on beneficiaries.     44 
 
Attention must be paid to what kind of technical assistance is appropriate and 
how much is needed.  The first major assessment of the cash transfer program in its 
initial phase (Schubert 1990) called for increased technical assistance to improve 
administrative capacity.  Practically every evaluation during the life of the program and 
members of the advisory technical committee spoke of insufficient administrative 
capacity as the single most important weakness of the program.  However, the technical 
assistance provided by Team Consult Berlin consisted of frequent multiple visits to the 
country to advise on design and revising implementing procedures, with training and 
capacity strengthening done via short workshops.  Only one technical support person 
(funded by UNICEF) was permanently present during the entire pilot phase.  There was 
no day-to-day outside technical assistance at the provincial level to help test and 
implement procedures.   
Given the dearth of qualified professional public servants because of 
Mozambique=s colonial legacy, a scarcity exacerbated by the war, and the lack of 
experience with this type of program within the region, in retrospect failure to pay 
attention to the low level of administrative capacity may have been a basic flaw in the 
original design of the transfer program.  Moreover, a desire to keep administrative costs 
as low as possible and the emphasis on showcasing the transfer as a strictly Mozambican 
program reinforced this tendency to inadequately tackle the weak administrative capacity 
of the program during its first five years of existence.  It is essential that sufficiently  45 
 
trained administrative personnel are in place before cash transfer programs are expanded 
to national levels.  
Administrative procedures must be straightforward and feasible. When human 
resources are limited, it is essential to avoid burdening them with complex administrative 
procedures.   Because of a lack of alternative social service programs, the cash transfer 
scheme included too many target groups with distinct eligibility requirements.  While 
eligibility criteria were fairly consistent throughout the life of the program, procedures for 
enrollment were complex.  Each category of beneficiary had a different set of criteria to 
meet, some requiring verification by health authorities, others not.  While enrollment 
procedures based on nutritional status proved easier to use than income-based means 
testing, the inclusion of malnutrition as a targeting tool at times confused the objectives 
of the program (refer to Schubert 1993a; Ginja and McDonald 1995) for examples of 
trying to show the impact of the subsidy reduction on  malnutrition).   
 In countries with limited human resources, eligibility criteria should be reasonable 
and  based on easily measurable indicators (demographic characteristics, employment 
status, asset ownership) correlated with income.  The income eligibility criteria based on 
an estimate of monthly income per capita was so low as to be nonsensical and therefore 
was ultimately ignored.  The utilization of a simple list of indicators typically correlated 
with income would be preferable to attempting to quantify income levels themselves. 
Administrative procedures must be in place to assure regular cost of living 
adjustments in the real value of the cash transfer.   A per capita transfer capable of  46 
 
purchasing one-third of daily caloric needs (approximately 750 kilocalories), based on the 
cost of calories for a balanced diet by region (North, Center, South) or province is 
recommended as a level that has the potential to substantially improve the well-being of 
recipients at reasonable cost, with minimal disincentive effects.  To maintain program 
impact, the benefit amount must be adjusted to keep pace with inflation. Some 
mechanism should exist to ensure that benefit levels are automatically adjusted for 
inflation.  In spite of being legally tied to the value of the minimum wage, the relative 
value of the cash transfer has so far failed to be maintained due to the lack of transparent, 
enforceable administrative procedures and the lack of political power of the recipients 
and their allies within the government. 
Adequate pilot testing is essential.  Pilot testing is key to working out 
administrative and logistic procedures, and although it can be supported through capacity-
building initiatives, scaling-up should not exceed the resource constraints and 
administrative capacity of the government.  A pilot program should implement, evaluate, 
modify, and reimplement to assure that administrative and logistic procedures are 
functioning well before nationwide expansion occurs.  The expansion of the program 
should be done in phases, to reduce strains and allow adequate capacity strengthening to 
occur concurrently.   
There was a pilot phase in the Mozambican case, and technical committees and 
consultants made substantial alterations in program design based on the pilot experience.  
However, the first major reorganization in 1991 failed to adequately address the  47 
 
fundamental problems of complexity of design and inadequacy of administrative capacity. 
 Instead, the program bowed to pressure to expand the number of beneficiaries 
dramatically when it still should have been concentrating on getting sufficient numbers of 
staff in place and adequately training that staff.  
 
Financial and Political 
Program authorities and supporters must manage internal and external 
political pressures to assure financial viability and sustainability of the program.  
Program authorities must think strategically to manage internal and external political 
pressures to assure the financial sustainability of the program, and funding should be 
linked to a fairly stable source of funds.  Political forces must view the transfer as an 
important component of the safety net strategy for the poor, and they must be committed 
to investing in safety nets.  Governments with limited resources may determine to spend 
those same funds to strengthen other social services that have important roles in reducing 
poverty (such as education). At the other extreme, they attempt to gain political support 
by expanding the program to cover more beneficiaries while reducing the amount of the 
benefit, sometimes to rather meaningless levels. 
To assure financial sustainability, strong political support from key ministries must 
exist.  Schubert recognized the high costs involved in covering the 60,000 households 
targeted under the scheme.  In 1993, he noted that the @scheme has always received the 
resolute support of the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers of the  48 
 
Republic of Mozambique.  This strong political determination was and is essential for the 
existence and success of the scheme@ (Schubert 1993a, 26).  Clearly, since the corruption 
crisis, this strong political support has been lost.  Action has simply not been taken to 
increase the value of the transfer in spite of several evaluations documenting the loss of 
the transfer=s purchasing power.  Lack of political support for the cash transfer program 
within the government since 1997 is being expressed as financial strangulation.  
Apparently, it is easier politically to let the program die a slow death than to suddenly 
eliminate all beneficiaries.  From the political standpoint, the program is unlikely to 
survive without substantial pressure from interest groups inside and outside the 
government.  
The failure of the cash transfer to keep pace with the cost of living reflects the lack 
of power of the destitute and their advocates.  Independent criteria that increase the value 
of the transfer automatically may be preferable to tying transfer increases in the transfer to 
other politically sensitive issues, like increases in the minimum wage.  Increases in the 
minimum wage affect a large proportion of both public and private expenditure.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that increases in the minimum wage frequently fail to keep 
pace with inflation (Pires 1997). Using criteria that automatically adjust benefits may 
enable the program to finesse the issue of political support by not having to tap into 
political capital each time an increase in benefit amounts is necessary.    
From the technical standpoint, a viable alternative would be to tie the value of the 
transfer to the national or regional average cost of calories of the most popular staple  49 
 
urban foodstuff (for example, maize flour), based on extant cost of living data.  Currently 
there is a single national rate for the cost-of-living, yet the cost of goods, particularly 
basic foodstuffs, varies widely between the three principal regions of the country (Datt et 
al. 1998).  Revised subsidy levels that take into account regional price differences in the 
cost of essential food and nonfood items could help minimize the financial burden to the 
state, and hence increase the likelihood of financial sustainability.  
In this respect, the Ministry of Social Action and NGOs responsible for caring for 
the destitute need to think of innovative ways to empower the destitute to become an 
effective lobby.  Increased involvement of trained social workers to complement the 
current administratively-oriented staff of the cash transfer program may assist in 
increasing transparency of service delivery and help communities care for their destitute 
populations.  In addition, social workers and NGOs could assure that recipients receive 
adequate benefits, using media coverage and other advocacy techniques to sustain 
political support and to assure that the law requiring increases in the subsidy proportional 
to the minimum wage is respected. 
From the outset, the program must consider how to become sustainable in the 
long term.  GAPVU was financed almost entirely out of the state budget, based on 
revenue from the sale of food aid, not as part of a multilateral agency loan.  The decline in 
monetized food aid sales threatened the program's financial viability.  Program supporters 
and budget officials must plan how to develop funding mechanisms from the start,  50 
 
perhaps considering alternative financing mechanisms, such as luxury taxes or value-
added taxes. 
In this context, it remains to be seen whether the Social Fund established by INAS 
as a means to attract additional donors to a whole set of social assistance programs, of 
which the cash transfer is just one, is a more viable approach to long-term funding 
support than sole reliance on the government budget.  Emphasis needs to be placed on 
receiving the financial support of private enterprises as well as international donors and 
on obtaining additional administrative support from local religious institutions and NGOs 
to assist with improving implementation of the scheme.  Positive efforts on the part of 
government to encourage such partnerships is reflected in a law passed in 1997, the Lei 
de Mecenato, which permits institutions and private enterprises to receive tax breaks for 
financial contributions made to social programs. 
 
 6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Although studies are not available to confirm this particular cash transfer program=s 
impact on poverty in Mozambique, it is clear that a cash transfer program can be an 
effective part of an overall social assistance strategy.  In an impoverished country 
struggling simply to get policies and priorities right, with a myriad of demands but few 
governmental resources, what is the role of social assistance programs?  And where, if 
anywhere, do cash transfer programs fit into an antipoverty strategy?    51 
 
Safety nets are intended mostly to Acatch@ and assist those that miss out on the 
benefits of economic growth (such as the disabled or those that cannot work), or those 
who need temporary assistance.  Especially in countries like Mozambique where poverty 
is widespread and a government=s financial resources are limited, mechanisms other than 
safety nets must be found to lift the majority out of poverty.  Large social assistance 
programs, such as direct transfers or social security, simply do not seem fiscally or 
politically sustainable in resource-poor countries.   
But a cash transfer program has its place.  Although cash transfers require 
significant administrative capacity and a relatively advanced information base to identify 
and reach the target population, a cash transfer program is an especially appropriate way 
to provide additional income to those who cannot work when they have no other support 
and so cannot benefit from economic growth.  A direct transfer to these groups may be 
especially appropriate in urban areas where social cohesion may be weaker than in rural 
areas and where few individuals have access to resources, such as land and water, that 
they use as a @natural@ safety net. 
Still, limitations to the effectiveness of cash transfers must be recognized.  For 
example, it may not be the most effective way to reduce malnutrition of the household=s 
most vulnerable members.  A smaller proportion of the transfer than desired may be spent 
on food or health care for the child or the pregnant or lactating mother, mitigating the 
transfer=s effect on malnutrition.  Moreover, other programs, such as feeding programs or 
nutrition education, may be better ways to improve nutritional status in low-income  52 
 
households.
10   In addition, the inclusion of target groups who can work may detract from 
the focus of the program on the destitute who really have no where to turn, a focus that 
may otherwise be useful to build up political support for the program.  
Additionally, a direct cash transfer to households where there are individuals 
capable of working can also create a disincentive for these individuals to look for work.  
Although this is less of a problem when the transfer is relatively small and the need is 
great, other programs, such as food- or cash-for-work, can be better suited to providing 
income to the household.  
                                                            
10 In Guatemala, for example, it was found that a direct nutritional supplement to the woman during 
pregnancy reduced the prevalence of low birth weight by half (Lechtig et al. 1975).  Preliminary results for 
Mozambique indicate that providing mothers with just some education may significantly improve child 
nutritional status (Garrett et al. 1998). 
Given finite resources and limited administrative capability, it seems reasonable 
that limiting the scope of  an urban cash transfer program to doing what a cash transfer 
program does well, and working to ensure sustained levels of meaningful financing for 
the program, will enhance the program=s effectiveness.   
A cash transfer program must also be seen in terms of how it fits into the larger 
scheme of economic growth and poverty alleviation measures.  Most especially, over 
time, it must come to form part of a complete array of programs of social assistance, 
which Mozambique is only beginning to create.  This could involve programs for  53 
 
specifically designed and targeted to vulnerable groups such as pregnant women, 
malnourished children, juveniles, and the unemployed.  Special programs and policies 
directed towards the disabled that are still physically capable of working could permit 
them to earn incomes from their own projects or to be fully integrated into the labor force. 
 These programs must integrate and coordinate with other programs of the government 
and of communities, religious organizations, and NGOs.  At this stage, though, the 
resources are few, but a program like this seems the minimum that a government can 
offer its society:  a program that provides subsistence-level support to only those truly 
destitute persons who have no other means of support. 
Can an urban transfer program work in Mozambique and countries similar to 
Mozambique?  We believe that the answer is yes.  Cash transfers certainly have a role in 
terms of the overall plan of providing social assistance, and although the lack of a 
rigorous evaluation prevents us from confirming the program's impact, Mozambique's 
experience appears to indicate that even a government of limited resources can carry out 
such a program, at least in urban areas where information and administrative capacity are 
sufficient.   Nevertheless, as noted above, social assistance programs must pay close 
attention to technical, administrative, financial, and political needs if they are to be 
successful. 
Do cash transfer programs impose greater administrative costs and informational 
burdens than other programs of social assistance, as some analysts suggest?  If so, are 
these burdens so great as to outweigh the benefits of the program?  No hard data are  54 
 
available for Mozambique, but it is possible that cash transfer programs require greater 
information and better financial control than, for instance, food subsidies.  There may be 
ways to reduce the administrative burden by establishing information systems that rely on 
nonintrusive, less time-consuming methods; by coordinating information collection and 
use with other government agencies; or by sharing administration, including program 
promotion and beneficiary identification and validation, with partner organizations at the 
community level.  Food subsidies, however, have often proved unsustainable because of 
high burdens on governmental budgets and additional costs due to leakage and distortions 
caused in local markets.  Further research should be undertaken to explore the impact and 
cost of recently introduced urban cash-for-work programs in comparison to the existing 
urban cash transfer program.  However, even if found to be more efficient, many 
beneficiaries included in current cash transfer schemes do not have the physical capacity 
to participate in cash-for-work endeavors. 
The current program apparently addresses key design flaws of the original program. 
 It has improved supervision, provided cleaner lines of authority, and developed more 
precise targeting and service delivery mechanisms.  If the financial and political support 
of the government is put behind these changes, partnership relationships with donor 
organizations are likely to emerge.  However, there are three key actions that need to be 
taken to improve support within and outside the Mozambican Government for the cash 
transfer program: (1) a complete review of management, including new procedures, 
should be made, and the transfer of responsibility to MICAS should be completed; (2) the  55 
 
eligibility criteria should be revised, replacing the unusable income criterion with a 
reasonable income level correlated with validated indicators of poverty, and (3) an inter-
Ministerial meeting should be held to determine  the appropriate level of the subsidy, to 
establish a reliable mechanism for cost-of-living adjustments in the benefit level, and to 
seek mechanisms to assure sustainable funding. 
Even if an urban cash program is working well, will it have impact?  In many 
cash transfer programs, there are problems of intrahousehold distribution of the cash 
transfer once it is received.  However, when target groups of those least able to participate 
in the work force, the destitute elderly, the disabled, and the chronically ill, which tend to 
come from households lacking economically active adults, the transfer is likely to directly 
benefit the recipients.  To have impact on actual levels of calorie consumption, the cash 
transfer would have to be tied to cost equivalence of an established number of calories 
sufficient to raise consumption levels above a minimum threshold, taking into account 
intrahousehold distribution of benefits and the extent of nonfood expenditures.  
Another potential side-effect that could reduce total impact of the cash transfer is 
that private transfers (from other households) to the individual who receives the public 
transfer will be reduced.  Recent evidence from the South African elderly pension 
scheme, which provides a cash transfer about twice the median per capita income of 
African households in South Africa, shows a significant reduction in remittances to 
pension recipients that are receiving remittances, varying from 20 to 30 cents for each  56 
 
Rand received (Jensen 1997).
11   However, qualitative data indicate that this is not the 
case for Mozambique (Schubert 1995; Bazo 1998; Quive 1998).  This is not surprising 
due to the low level of private transfers being received by these socially isolated 
individuals and the extensive poverty, which means that households have less to share, in 
Mozambique. 
                                                            
11 Note that 50% of South African pension recipients are not receiving any private remittances. 
Can the government extend this program to rural areas?  In rural areas, long 
distances between beneficiaries and high transport and communication costs may mean 
that the cost of delivery may far outweigh the amount of the benefit.  Moreover, the 
subsidy may undermine existing social relations in rural areas.  For instance, in some 
rural areas of Mozambique, communities have strong feelings concerning who among the 
vulnerable actually merit outside assistance.  Targeted cash transfer programs may result 
in recipients receiving reduced assistance or facing increased resentment from other 
members of the community  (Dava, Low, and Matusse 1998).  If a targeted cash program 
were introduced, consideration should be given to concurrent establishment of 
complementary programs that would allow nontargeted members of the community to 
participate. 
The urban cash transfer program in Mozambique is at a critical juncture.  
Administrative mechanisms have been revised to address many of the previous failings.   57 
 
Target groups have been appropriately redefined to focus on those incapable of working 
and so participating in other types of social assistance schemes.   Evaluations and reason 
have indicated that, at an reasonable level of benefit, the program can positively affect the 
lives of the destitute in Mozambique.  Yet political support for the program is uncertain, 
threatening its sustainability.   We believe the government should continue to support this 
program because it should take the lead not only in providing structures to promote 
economic growth but also to providing support for those who growth has left behind.  The 
government is the only institution able to coordinate national programs of this size, even 
when it must rely on other partners (nongovernmental organizations, religious 
institutions, private enterprises) for substantial logistic or financial support.   
Urban areas of Mozambique have a truly destitute population that is surviving 
below minimally acceptable levels of consumption.  For the program to have impact it 
must be supported politically and financially and there must be sufficient financial 
support to make a difference to the destitute population it is trying to protect.  Transfer 
amounts remain at such abysmally low levels as to have little impact on well-being of 
these most vulnerable. The value of the transfer needs to be increased sufficiently to make 
an impact on the consumption levels of a well-targeted group of truly destitute persons 
incapable of work.  At the same time, the amount of the transfer should not be so high as 
to cause a significant decline in support that destitute beneficiaries are receiving from 
others and must take into account the limited resources of the government.   58 
 
No matter what the level of the new transfer, the government will need to develop 
new mechanisms for sustained funding as well as seek partners to financially and 
administratively support this endeavor.  INAS, faced with opposition from the Ministry of 
Finance to expanding the budget for the program, is already attempting to procure support 
for the cash transfer as well as other proposed poverty reduction programs from external 
donors and NGOs.  Once the recommended increased cash transfer level is in place, the 
revised administrative structure of the INAS program has the potential to provide much 
needed social assistance to the poorest and most vulnerable members of Mozambican 
society.   
Mozambique's urban cash transfer program should be viewed as one component of 
an overall strategy to reduce and alleviate poverty.  Its ability to support a program of this 
nature provides a model for other developing countries and, perhaps especially, other 
African countries emerging from conflict.  In war-torn societies,  extended conflict 
damages the social networks on which many of the most vulnerable depend for survival.  
 There is a crying need to rebuild social networks  that support livelihood strategies.  As 
part of the government's responsibility to represent the values of the society it has been 
elected to represent, it has an inherent duty to protect its most vulnerable members.  With 
this program, the Mozambican Government provides important leadership for all of 
Mozambican society, providing a basis on which citizens can rebuild the trust and support 
that are essential for effective communities and their effective participation in society. 
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 (continued) 
 
Datt et al. 
(1997) 
 







criterion (24.000 MT 
per capita per month) 
is so low (3 of the 
poverty line) that it is 
impossible to 
comply; There were 
elderly living in 
households with 




Impressive coverage:  
 16% of urban 
households; Almost 
50% of recipient 
households headed by 
women; 
As  85% of the 
country=s population is 
rural, need specific 
policies for reducing 
poverty in rural areas. 
 
30% of transfers 
are leakages to the 
non-poor; less 
leakage in the 
malnourished 




than in elderly 
target group 
(selection criteria 
based on income) 
 
Difficult to evaluate 
because of lack of non-
beneficiary group being 
included in the study.  
Transfer contributes 13% 
of monthly per capita 
expenditure; Contributed 
to poverty reduction 
(71% incidence  without 






composition varies a lot 
between cities, 









analysis of 626 
households 
 
Income criterion is 
not utilized because 
it is not realistic.  
Criteria for the 
selection of pregnant 
women are imprecise 
and delay their entry 
into the program.  
 
Need strategy to  
improve communi-
ation about program 
existence.  Should 
only include elderly 
and handicapped 
persons; Not best way 
to effectively reduce 
malnutrition.   
 
Some beneficiaries 
are not paid the 
correct amount.  
 
The study design does 





A more comprehensive 
study of the efficiency 
of the management and 
operation of GAPVU is 










analysis of 626 
households 
 
The income criterion 
must be adjusted to a 
more realistic level. 
 
Define goals for 
coverage and estimate 
their costs.  Target 
groups need to be 
reassessed: program 
should only benefic 
those social groups 
incapable of working 
(elderly, 
handicapped).   
 
30% of transfers 
are leaked to 





Including persons capable 
of working (for example, 
women with malnourished 
children) can lead to 
reducing incentives to 
work.  
 
Reinforce capacity in 
terms of human and 
material capital;  Low 
operation costs (2.1%) 
reflect weak 
institutional capacity; 
Reduce the waiting 
time for transfer 
payment;  Maintain 
permanent 
communication with 
the beneficiaries in 
order to inform them 
regarding changes in 
the program.  
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High degree: More 





in  Maputo & Matola 
suggests raising the 
income eligibility 
requirement to being 
less than 60.000 MT 
per month 
 
Some have other 
sources of income, 
but leaks are not 
serious. 
 
Transfer furnishes 462.3 
kilocalories per day; 
does not produce any 
improvements in basic 
alimentation. 
 
Does not produce any 
substantial alteration in 
living conditions. 
 
Participants do not 
possess minimal 
knowledge of their 
basic social rights. 
 





Survey of 41 
Elderly 










criterion; There were 
elderly destitutes 
living with a person 
of economically 
active age.  
 
Was not investigated. 
 
Still exist some 
non-qualified 
persons in the 
program, but the 
level of leakage is 
not worrisome. 
 
No significant difference 
in average consumption 
between participants and 
non-participants.  
Average level of 
consumption is 1400 
kilocalories per person 
per day that is below the 
minimal level for staying 
healthy; Level of transfer 
should be tied to 
purchasing power for a 
determined number of 
calories. 
 
Participants depend less 
on begging and other 




participate more in 
rotating credit programs 




Lack of regular 
payments during the 
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Group interviews  







participants do not 







Living alone is not a 
realistic criterion: 
how can persons 
with limited physical 
capacity survive 
without the help of 
other persons? 
 
Was not investigated 
 
Re-structuring 
exercise (prova da 
vida) showed that 
only 33% of the 
beneficiaries on 
the GAPVU list 
were qualified; 
these remained in 
INAS . 
 
Transfer lasts on average 
only 2 days and the rest 
of the time beneficiaries 
must fend for 
themselves.   
 
69% responded that their 
life improved with the 
program;  38% stated 
their material situation 
improved; "There is no 
doubt that the State=s 
financial assistance has a 
positive effect on the lives 
of the beneficiaries.  This 
program contributes 
strongly to the 
development of social 
tissue which in a certain 
way contributes to the 
maintenance of social 
stability, thus avoiding the 
total social disintegration 
of some of the needy 
populations."  Some used 
the transfer to made 
drinks to sale or do petty 
trade; provides 
opportunities for social 
interaction among isolated 
persons.  Free access to 
public transport in urban 
areas. 
 
Improvement of the 
payment system; 
Permanentes & nurses 
receiving regular 
salaries  (300000 MT 
monthly); Verification 
of beneficiary lists 
between the 
permanente and the 
delegations in order to 
prevent corruption. 
Many beneficiaries 
only receive the 
minimum (32000 MT) 
when they have the 
right to more.  Lack of 
collaboration with other 
programs (e.g. caixa 
















Are too restrictive;  
Use multi-
disciplinary teams to 
identify potential 
beneficiaries; Results 
from poverty profiles 
can help establish 
 
Reduce the total 
number of 
beneficiaries in order 







In order to have impact: 
the transfer must be 
raised to 50% of the 
minimum wage for a 
household with only one 




Ministry of Planning 
and Finance must 
provide the material 
conditions to capacitate 
 MICAS; 
Introduce luxury taxes, 
whose receipts can be  
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Other Impact:  
Improved Living 
Conditions   
 
Management 




the chronically ill 
(chronically poor, but 
not structural poverty) 
 
used to finance the 
social safety net;  Lack 
of divulgation of 
information concerning 
the program. 
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Table 2. Comparison of the Composition of Beneficiaries of the Cash Transfer 
Program (Subsídio dos Alimentos) during the Expansion Phase under 





August 1995 (GAPVU) 
 























  Elderly 
  Handicapped 
  Pregnant Women 
  Women with Malnourished 
     Children 
  Chronically Ill 
  Female Heads of House- 



















  2,927 








    5,855 
    5,414 
    2,936 
    2,333 
    3,549 
    3,334 
    6,075 
  11,164 
     4,441 
     2,853 
     6,250 
     3,403 




  4.2 








  8.5 
  7.8 
  4.3 
  3.4 
  5.1 
  4.8 
  8.8 
16.2 
  6.4 
  4.1 
  9.1 





  2,022 
     453 
  
 3,253 
       55 




     4,175 
     5,478 
     1,412 
     1,120 
     2,293 
     3,192 
     3,007 
     2,523 
     2,344 
        915 
     3,107 
        906 




  6.3 
  1.4 
 
10.1 
  0.2 
 





   4.4 
   3.5 
   7.1 
   9.9 
   9.3 
   7.8 
   7.3 
   2.8 
   9.6 
   2.8 
   5.6 
 
 
  -28.9 
  -30.9 








  -28.7 
 +  1.2 
  -51.9 
  -52.0 
  -35.4 
  -  4.3 
  -50.5 
  -77.4 
  -47.2 
  -67.9 
  -50.3 
  -73.4 












         -53.2 
 
Sources:  August 1995 (GAPVU 1995); December 1997 (INAS 1997). 
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Table 3.  Comparison of Total Volume of Consumption (in Meticais) and Total 
Calories Consumed During the Last 24 Hours by 41 Elderly Cash Transfer 
Recipients and 40 Nonparticipants (December 1997), by Household, Per 





                  Quartiles 









Value in Meticais: 
























































































































Source:  Bazo (1998). 
 
a There is no significant difference between participant and nonparticipant means, according to 
the results of the t-tests. 
  70 
 
 
 FIGURES Figure 1.  Organigram of  
Gabinete de Apoio à População Vulnerável




























Unit of Program Establisment 
and Supervision in
10 Cities




Secretary of State for Social Action























  Source:  Schubert (1993b)
Figure 2.  Organigram of 
Gabinete de Apoio à População Vulnerável
Office of Assistance to the Vulnerable Population
 (GAPVU) 1994-1996
72Figure 3.  Organigram of the
Instituto Nacional de Acção Social








Office of Public Relations Legal Office




NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL ACTION
(INAS)
NATIONAL DIRECTOR











































73Figure 4.  Evolution of the Value of the Cash 
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